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the fires of feminist criticism. Few, if any,
feminist literary critics and critics of American
criticism managed to negotiate a course that avoided
Even so, much remains to be said, for feminist
has only recently passed from its reactionary be-
and is now poised to become a proactive,
fully-developed critical discipline. Only with a strongly de-
fined sense of gender identity and a balanced look at prin-
ciples of gender can feminist criticism hone a philosophical
base and moral view in a manner that redefines natural law so
that feminine values are accepted as human values appropriate
for both sexes.
Questions relative to identity--Who am I? Why am I here?
What is my place in the universe?--are the basic questions of
all thinking people from before the beginning of recorded
history, as our mythological heritage indicates, to the
present, as scanning current philosophical, psychological,
sociological, and theological writing attests; our literature
testifies to this ongoing quest. From Socrates onward, our
1
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heritage is one of relentless, critical self-examination.
Concepts of self-identity, along with valid principles of
thought and action, engage each new generation of scholars
and thinkers. Feminist scholars are simply advancing a tra-
dition inherent in the Western cultural experience.
The quest for identity has engaged philosophers from
Socrates to Sartre; writers and poets from Sappho to Sarton,
from Homer to Heller give voice to this perpetual search for
meaning and value. But for the most of our recorded literary
history, male voices define the human condition. Women's
voices and their life experiences have been ignored, si-
lenced, or viewed as illegitimate. In explaining and defend-
ing (yes, feminists still find it necessary to defend their
position) her feminist perspective, theologian Carol Christ
restates a basic plank from the feminist platform that reit-
erates the centrality of identity:
Women live in a world where women's stories rarely
have been told from their own perspectives. The
stories celebrated in culture are told by men.
Thus men have actively shaped their experiences of
self and world, and their most profound stories
orient them to what they perceive as the great pow-
ers of the universe. But since women have not told
their own stories, they have not actively shaped
their experiences of self and world nor named the
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great powers from their own perspectives. Of
course women appear in the stories of men, but only
in roles defined by men--usually mothers, wives,
sisters, lovers, nurses, assistants, or whores.
Christ's simple, straightforward, and nonthreatening
assertion functions as a fundamental tenent of feminist
thought; but such a position, even today, encounters resis-
tance, subtle perhaps, but resistance nevertheless. The sto-
ries of women's lives, in the words of the women who lived
them, have barely begun to infiltrate the sacrosanct literary
canon. The poets who write honestly of women's realities are
actively and consistently creating a new standard, one that
will rank equally with the literature we are familiar with
today. But the task is closer to its inception than to its
conclusion. Perhaps because of the widespread resistance to
and lack of understanding of feminist thought, prominent
feminist critics seem willing to concede that early dreams of
a feminist ideological revolution must be abandoned in favor
of a merger or reconciliation with traditional mainstream
criticism.
The cover of Judith Spector's Gender Studies: New Di-
rections in Feminist Criticism dramatically illustrates the
current status of feminist criticism--on a stark white back-
ground bold arrows point up, down, right, and left; or north,
4
south, east, and west, depending upon your perspective. Or,
it could be argued, feminist criticism has no clear direc-
tion. In spite of the illustrative cover, in Gender Studies 
Spector sadly concludes that feminist criticism must change
its focus to proceed toward the twenty-first century as a le-
gitimate critical discipline:
One of the most effective means of fostering the
feminist critical approach is to include works by
women within traditional curricula, where that is
possible, certainly, but also to point out atti-
tudes toward gender within traditional works of
literature. That tactic brings us back to the
original dialogue with the male-dominated tradi-
tion. This time around, though, the feminist
critic can, in addition to critiquing an obviously
masculine sexist perspective, also teach literature
by women writers in a positive manner. We are not
back where we started as mere detractors on the
sidelines; we are in danger of remaining on the
sidelines only if we insist on teaching and study-
ing literature only by women. (4)
Spector cautions those who promote women's studies and
feminist criticism as separate disciplines that "keeping
women professionals occupied with 'women's literature' is one
way of keeping them out of the establishment" (4) and also
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that such marginal, isolated departments quit
e likely would
be among the first to suffer in times of financ
ial difficul-
ties and budget cutbacks.
Spector wisely identifies two very real pitf
alls that
feminist critics can ill afford to ignore, 
but even with
these serious issues, the time is not yet r
ight for cur-
riculum integration. Even though feminist cr
itical theory
dominates many literary conferences and scho
larly journals,
even though colleges and universities continu
e to establish
women's studies programs to promote feminist 
criticism in all
disciplines, feminist critical theory in liter
ature continues




academic discipline with fundamental weak-
its acceptance as a recognized, legitimate
Far too many critics stand firm in their
in the traditional standards of excellence
that have shaped the curriculum and the c
urrent
knowledge as representative of the best "man
" has





standard is as strong and as deeply entrenche
d in our cul-
tural heritage can feminist critics relax 
and peacefully
co-exist with the traditionalists. Only when 
female experi-
ence is accorded the same recognition now giv
en to the male
experience can the curriculum be integrated.
After three decades of political activism, th
e feminist
movement has slowed its pace and its rhetoric an
d has backed
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off from its earlier militant stance. Feminist critical
theory, like its parent, also has reached the stage in its
development where a reevaluation of its methods, principles,
and aims is called for. As the twentieth century ends,
feminist critical theory is impaled on the horns of a di-
lemma. Feminist critics themselves disagree on the future of
gender difference. One group considers gender irrelevant;
the other celebrates a female culture. Despite this differ-
ence in opinion, women remain in agreement on their distrust
of traditional critics. Cheri Register's case against what
she called "Phallic Criticism" in 1976 continues to unite
women today:
Feminist critics claim to have good cause for ques-
tioning scholarly objectivity and critical absolut-
ism. Their dispute with established, reputedly
non-ideological critics, most of whom are male, fo-
cuses on three allegations: (1) they fail to dis-
cuss female writers as writers, without regard for
their sex; (2) they ignore many female writers al-
together; and (3) they have a myopic tendency to
make universal statements on the basis of male ex-
perience. (8)
Register's reasoning is not as circular as it seems.
Feminist critics continue to address gender as a primary
concern because the disparities Register mentions still
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flourish. After thirty years, feminist criticism must con-
tinue to focus on gender identity because one generation is
not nearly enough time to correct 2,500 years of male-defined
history. The traditional view of female selfhood continues
to be rooted in changeable social practices and materialistic
outward trappings. This narrow view permeates our academic
institutions as well as our popular culture. Part of this
current intense attention to matters of identity can be
viewed as a product of the time, as no critical theory can
completely divorce itself from its time and place. The past
two decades, the coming-of-age period for feminist criticism,
have been devoted to the selfish needs and materialistic
wants of the individual. As the decades of the individual
give way to an era rooted in community, feminist critical
theory, too, must, out of necessity, adopt a broader view;
but a strong philosophical base has been put in place, and
that underpining must not be compromised.
Feminist criticism risks becoming a closed system
dominated by a few well-recognized names who continually cite
each other's work, perpetuating an endless circle of minor
variations on the same issues. A critical school with such a
blatant disregard for traditions and alternative interpreta-
tions will fail to flourish. For many feminist critics, any
work which does not pass the feminist litmus test based on
political assumptions regarding the social status of women is
8
automatically rejected as lacking in merit. Feminist
criticism, left in the hands of fanatics, risks being as
systematically single-minded as the systems it seeks to re-
place.
In spite of its shortcomings, feminist critical theory
has revitalized and enhanced literary criticism. It is right
and good to question fundamental assumptions about class,
culture, and gender. Ethical stances must be subjected to
constant scrutiny in light of new knowledge and new under-
standing. However, it serves no reasonable purpose to replace
one biased view of the world with another one-sided system.
As Josephine Donovan noted in the ground breaking work,
Feminist Literary Criticism, "a feminine aesthetic will pro-
vide for the integration into the critical process of the ex-
periences denoted as feminine in our culture" (79). As
Donovan and other critics have pointed out, no critic can
justifiably contend that the male experience alone fully de-
fines what it means to be alive and human. Hunan experience
must be defined in terms of both male and female experience.
But this is where feminist critical theory, like traditional
critical theory, breaks down. Rather than focus on both
male and female experience or common human experiences,
feminist critics, all too often, center their studies on mas-
culinity and femininity -- changeable constructs delineated
by culture.
9
How, you might wonder, does Emily Dickinson fit into
this scheme? Why yet another paper on Emily Dickinson? The
poetry of Emily Dickinson, with her strong identity as a fe-
male poet, exemplifies both the fundamental fallacies in and
the philosophical justification for feminist critical
theory. Dickinson is especially important because her life,
but not her mind, was severely constricted and limited by
the prevailing theological and philosophical ideologies of
her time. Even so, Dickinson achieved wholeness in her life
and work, albeit with great pain. Dickinson exhibited a full
dimension of experience and authority of mind, body, and rea-
son. Alicia Ostriker, who "places Dickinson among the great
writers of the English language" (38) explains why Dickinson
commands the attention of critics:
Dickinson's artistry exceeds others' because, al-
though she may have feared much, she did not fear
her own mind. She never retreats from an insight,
never withdraws or retracts, but bears it out to
the edge of doom, in language and rhythms formed to
reflect precisely the swiftness, compactness, and
drama of that single subject, her mind. (42)
Quite simply, Dickinson's accomplishments inspire excellence.
This paper will draw on the work of leading feminist
critics and the works of Dickinson, her biographers, and her
critics. No effort is being made to trace the history of
z
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feminist criticism; that has been done numerous times by
critic after critic. Nor does this paper attempt to provide
a concordance to critical thought on Dickinson. That, too,
is unnecessary. Rather, this paper looks at the relationship
between self-identity in Dickinson's poetry and the fundamen-
tal need for such a pronounced sense of identity to serve as
the cornerstone of feminist criticism. Dickinson's courage to
be female and the implications of that courage on her world
view are at the core of neofeminist or post-feminist
criticism. Dickinson exhibited an independence of mind that
broke out of the boxes of cultural constraints developing a
strong sense of identity as a woman and as a poet. She ex-
pressed a strong moral view of the world solidly grounded in,
but often critical of, the Christian tradition. With her
strong sense of self, her overarching moral vision, and hef
disregard for the "oughts" and "shoulds" of her culture,
Dickinson held her work to a high standard of significance.
Feminist criticism is only now reaching such a standard of
significance. As Dickinson achieved personal wholeness and
creative integrity through the integration of (not the oblit-
eration or repression of) opposing qualities, feminist
criticism, too, must have that same courage to stand firm in
the face of powerful opposition and defy social and political
pressures to conform. Conforming to a mediocre, and conse-
quently powerless but socially acceptable, integrated posi-
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tion within mainstream criticism places feminist criticism
once again on the sidelines waiting for the next popular
trend to relegate it even further from the intellectual cen-
ter.
Chapter 1: Dimensions of Possibility
Our own possessions-though our own-
'Tis will to hoard anew-
Remembering the Dimensions
Of Possibility.' *1208
For writers there are no "new truths." There is only one
very old truth, as old as Sappho, as old as Homer, as old as
the Song of Deborah, as old as the Songs of David--that the
imagination is free, that the gift of making literature is
accessible to every kind and condition of human being, that
when we write we are not women or men but blessed beings in
possession of a Promethean art, an art encumbered by peril
and hope and fire and, above all, freedom. What we ought to
do as writers, is not wait for freedom, meanwhile idling in
self-analysis; the freedom one waits for, or builds strat-
egies toward, will never come. What we ought to do, as writ-
ers, is seize freedom now, immediately, by recognizing that
we already have it.
Cynthia Ozick
1 All Quotations of Emily Dickinson's poetry are taken from




All ideas require gestation periods. Sociologists know that
each social push forward is accompanied by groups organized
to hold back the hands of time. Anthropologists know that
cultural changes span decades, even centuries. Biologists
confirm that evolutionary changes occur gradually over time.
Geologists know that in the process of metamorphopsis a stage
is reached when the rock is neither what it was nor what it
will be. Psychologists note that resistance to change is a
normal human reaction. Yet, in every field the point of
critical mass is eventually reached, change inevitably oc-
curs, a slow process of acceptance and further refinement
follows, and eventually the existing body of knowledge incor-
porates the new idea or scientific principle. So it is with
feminist criticism.
Feminist criticism has reached a crucial stage in its
development, and not surprisingly, opinions vary widely as to
its future direction. Along with "New York Intellectuals,
Existential Critics, hermeneuticists, Reader-Response Crit-
ics, semioticians, deconstructors, Black Aestheticians,
Marxist-Leninists, and Neo-Marxists," feminist critical
theory falls into what Vincent B. Leitch refers to in a new
work on American literary criticism as "leftist criticism"
(407). Therefore, it should come as no surprise to any lit-
erary scholar with little more than a passing knowledge of
contemporary socio-political issues that any theory closely
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aligned with leftist concerns is, in 1991, out of favor as
the social and political scale tips farther and farther to
the right. As feminist criticism has, from its inception in

















criticism and gender identity and its so-called radical in-
tellectual position, feminist critical theory faces the dis-
tinct possibility of remaining a reactionary critical method
for a small group of adherents whose influence does not ex-
tend far beyond the walls of their respective universities.
Just as the modern feminist movement has failed to con-
vince the majority of modern American women of a need for
radical societal change, feminist literary criticism, like-
wise, has failed to coalesce into a viable, unified critical
method with an influential following, remaining instead an
adjunct theory outside the mainstream. The problem is not
that the feminist movement failed; on the contrary, it suc-
ceeded admirably in addressing women's issues, making
American life more equitable for men as well as women.
Feminist criticism arose out of a sociological context with
strong political overtones as chronicled in the publication
of Betty Friedan's The  Feminine Mystique, Kate Millet's
Sexual Politics, and Germaine Greer's The Female Eunuch.
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Following the surge of feminism in the 60s, feminist schol-
ars, teachers, and students examined the "images of woman" as
put forth by mostly male writers and critics. The 70s saw a
search for and promotion of works by female writers and po-
ets, often with little regard for the work's literary merit.
The last decade saw an attempt to redefine the canon of
literature to include those "found" geniuses of the 70's.
Yet, this rise in popularity and the number of works on
feminist criticism or women's issues published is not in-
dicative of excellence in scholarship but a lowering of stan-
dards in general.
in a sense, contemporary feminism has completely re-
versed itself, and feminist literary critics go along as just
another cog in the wheel. Initially, the modern feminist
movement rejected the "anatomy is destiny" arguments and at-
tempted to break down the barriers that segregated women be-
cause of their unique female nature. In Cynthia Ozick's
words, "classical feminism.. .saw itself as justice and aspi-
ration made universal, as mankind widened to humankind...."
(80). But after years of demanding equality, some women are
once again setting themselves apart; Ozick says that "more
and more, apartness is perceived as the dominant aim, even
the chief quality, of feminism" (80). Feminist literary
critics follow the same line of thought as they insist on
isolating and separating women's issues and concerns. Such
16
separatism and isolation rests on a precarious set of danger-
ous assumptions--assumptions which reinforce the outdated no-
tions that "intellect and imagination" divide neatly along
gender lines (Ozick 80). Ozick, a writer and critic whose
work exerts international influence, has been virtually ig-
nored by the most recent crop of feminist critics because she
boldly criticizes when criticism is rightfully due:
Now we are enduring a feminism so far advanced into
"new truths" that it has arrived at last at a set
of notions indistinguishable from the most
age-encrusted, unenlightened, and imprisoning
antifeminist views. (81)
On both sides of the Atlantic, feminist critics simply follow
trendy political and sociological research trends, ignoring
the wisdom of voices like Ozick's: "Outside its political
uses, 'woman writer' has no meaning--not intellectually, not
morally, not historically. A writer is a writer" (56).
Feminist critical theory has failed to break out of the
narrow category of fringe movements and rise above its second
rate classification because its most respected and most pro-
lific advocates have only recently advanced a moral, philo-
sophical view of the world that builds on rather than tears
down the Western cultural tradition. This is not, by any
means, to suggest that feminist critics should blindly accept
all that has been handed down. Much of our Western cultural
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heritage, most assuredly, contains blatantly misogynistic
traditions, and many of our greatest thinkers and writers
have considered man, the male of the species, the sum of all
that is good. Nevertheless, this heritage cannot be denied;
the past cannot be changed. As noted historian Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. explained when he called Ethnic Studies
Un-American:
...we inherit an American experience, as America
inherits a European experience. To deny the essen-
tial European origins of American culture is to
falsify history....Let us by all means teach
women's history, black history, Hispanic history.
But let us teach them as history, not as a means of
promoting group self-esteem....If we repudiate the
quite marvelous inheritance that history has be-
stowed on us, we invite the fragmentation of our
own culture into a quarrelsome spatter of enclaves,
ghettos, and tribes. The bonds of cohesion in our
society are sufficiently fragile...that it makes no
sense to strain them by encouraging and exalting
cultural and linguistic apartheid.
A "spatter of enclaves" aptly defines the current state
of feminist criticism. The primary division is between
French and American critics, but within the American camp ma-
jor factions vie for legitimacy and recognition. Here is how
18
Betsy Draine assesess the situation:
The biblical story of the "wisdom of Solomon" bears
reading as a parable of the recent state of
feminist literary theory. 1 Kings 3:16-22 tells
the tale of two harlots who bore sons while dwell-
ing in the same house. One of the infants died in
the night, and as the tale begins, both mothers
stand before King Solomon, each claiming that the
live child belongs to her. The disputed baby may
be seen as symbolizing the future of feminist
theory. The dead one can stand for whatever in
past feminist theory may be judged lifeless and
useless.... various feminist theorists, still some-
what marginal to literary theory, contend before
the bar of the academic profession for the unoffi-
cial title of 'mother of the new feminism'...."
(144)
While such recognition will acknowledge the seriousness and
the validity of feminist theory, it still will keep women
scholars in the margin and on the outside. Draine calls for
conscientious scholars "to cut through partisan antagonisms
to critical issues that can be debated, clarified, and nego-
tiated on their merits" (148). The past can and should be
reconsidered with a view toward the future, what Adrienne
Rich refers to as "Re-vision--the act of looking back, of
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seeing with fresh eyes, of entering an old text from a new
critical direction..." ("Dead Awaken" 18). This
"re-visioning" can be accomplished without the "fragmentation
of our culture." Schlesinger is certainly right to maintain
that in recent years our academic institutions have taught
"literature not as an intellectual challenge but as psycho-
logical therapy." And few self-respecting feminist teachers,
writers, or critics can deny that assaults on the estab-
lished canon have, far too often, been little more than
cathartic, therapeutic attempts to bolster "group
self-esteem."
Any new idea, however well-intentioned, which operates
without regard for the past faces certain doom. While this
idea may not be amenable to feminist thought, it remains a
fact--the American political, economic, social and academic
systems discourage rapid, radical change.
Astute feminist critics know that their discipline has
survived the throes of development. From a violent birth to
a rebellious adolescence to a frequently-erring young adult-
hood, feminist criticism now stands ready for the final rite
of passage--the entry into the mature wisdom of adulthood.
As we near the start of a new century, a new generation of
feminist critics stands ready to extinguish the myth of women
so that real women, women with intellectual dignity, can as-
sert themselves with the same freedom previously available
20
almost exclusively for males and a few exceptional women.
The traditional view that good criticism, like good lit-
erature, is sexless has failed to convincingly acknowledge
that prior to the 60s, both literature and criticism were in-
disputably male-oriented. That good literature and good
criticism rise above gender-specific issues is a
self-indulgent fiction; when only one version of reality
claims to speak for all humankind, that version of reality is
inherently limited and distorted. Certainly much female ex-
perience parallels that of the male. Much, though, is
uniquely female. That half of the human experience has never
been given a full representation in our literary history.
Despite the occasional presence of an influential woman such
as Dickinson, "American literature is male:"
To read the canon of what is currently considered
classic American literature is perforce to identify
as male. It insists on universality at the same
time that it defines that universality in spe-
cifically male terms. (Fetterley xii)
Feminist critics deserve credit for asking the embarassing
and uncomfortable questions about the literary canon and the
relation of gender. Likewise, mainstream critics deserve
credit for urging caution, for pointing out the weaknesses in
new critical methods, and for reining in the fanatics. Conse-
quently, constructing a new method with feminine prin-
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ciples alone in no way remedies the situation. To move for-
ward as a separate fie'd of study or to significantly influ-
ence other critical methods, which is infinitely more
practical, feminist criticism must, as Josephine Donovan has
pointed out, integrate male and female aesthetics. Ulti-
mately, Donovan's ideal probably will prevail, but now the
scale remains skewed toward the masculine because, for gen-
erations, "women are taught to think as men, to identify with
a male point of view, and to accept as normal and legitimate
a male system of values" (Fetterley xx). One of the major
obstacles to overcome in bringing this much-needed balance to
the field of literature, one that continues to generate
heated controversy across the academic disciplines as well as
outside the university, is that of gender identity. Only when
feminist critics take a balanced, reasonable look at identity
and its role in the creative process and tolerate a fair
amount of diversity and conflict, as did Emily Dickinson, can
feminist literary critics expect to exert significant influ-
ence both inside and outside the English Departments of their
institutions. By the same token, the same level of integrity
is required of males as readers, teachers, scholars, critics,
writers, and poets.
Gender identity was and is one of the key issues to
which feminist critics address their talent and energy
because gender is of primary significance in any social or
22
cultural analysis. From the earliest feminist writing to the
most recent, the issue of identity as a woman has been a fo-
cal point for women writing about women. This ongoing process
of individuation should come as no surprise; it comes as the
result of centuries of measuring self-hood against white,
upper-class male standards. But, that "socially, politically,
and economically powerful subgroup of the human race" is not
now nor has it ever been "the generic type for the normal hu-
man condition" with all other people "important only as ob-
stacles, aids, or rewards" (Pearson and Pope 4) to the heroic
male. Women throughout our recorded history intuitively know
that the male representations of identity perpetuated in our
cultural, religious, and literary heritage deny the existence
of an independent, autonomous female identity. Traditional
criticism "perpetuates the ideology that all people are male"
(Ostriker 53 ). This does not mean, of course, that the
masculine perspective should be ignored. Quite the contrary,
as most reasonable feminist critics agree; focusing on expe-
riences from a male point of view is also legitimate, but the
fact needs to be made clear that the view is male and not a
claim of universality.
Carol Pearson and Katherine Pope, who document heroism
in the lives of women in The Female Hero in American and
British Literature, point with exquisite precision to the
reason why women, historically, fail to "develop their in-
23
dividual identities":
In general, female independent selfhood was and
still is defined by the traditional patriarchy as
theologically evil, biologically psychologically
unhealthy, and socially in bad taste. Literature,
therefore, tends to portray the woman who demon-
strates initiative, strength, wisdom, and indepen-
dent action--the ingredients of the heroic
life--not as a hero but as a villain. (6)
Yes, by all means, notable exceptions can be found in each
century, but, by and large, Pearson and Pope's claim holds
true, extending to women writers as well as women subjects.
Pearson and Pope argue a strong case, but the inherent worth
of their argument is unquestionably weakened by their accus-
ing, strident tone and their choice of words such as "tradi-
tional partiarchy."
Dickinson is only one of a long line of women who exhib-
ited strength, courage, intelligence from the viewpoint of a
woman only to be considered "an exception, a deviant, and
doomed to destruction' (Pearson and Pope 7). Such a view of
female identity is a powerful destructive force in the lives
of women, men, and the families they create; just as impor-
tantly, it denies "the repeated instances of bravery,
strength, and wisdom by women in their roles as wives, moth-
ers, protectors, and breadwinners" (6).
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But why, after three decades of the women's revolution,
do the same questions continue to surface: Why is female
identity considered as "other" while male identity is consid-
ered "self?" Why do women so willingly sacrifice self as
they so willingly accept the constraints and limitations of
their culture? Why does self image continue to loom as a
major issue in the lives of women? How do women as writers
project their self identity in their work? Regardless of what
we, both women and men, say, we still regard the male per-
spective as the norm, which means, of course, that we still
must continue to justify all deviations from that norm. Until
our institutions fully accept and incorporate the feminine
(not necessarily feminist) ethic to complement the male
ethic, these questions remain crucial to an understanding of
female identity and the necessity of its affirmation.
"Humanity is male," wrote Simone de Beauvoir in 1949,
"and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him;
she is not regarded as an autonomous being ... He is the Sub-
ject, he is the Absolute--she is the Other" (89). Sadly
enough, the changes in this attitude have been minuscule, de-
spite solid economic, social, and political gains for many of
the world's women. Feminist theory currently functions as
the intellectual system that inculcates into all our institu-
tions the still radical idea that the feminine is a crucial
element of the human. Feminism is unique in that it inte-
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grates theory into practice and merges thought with action.
As such, feminism possesses a dynamic, life-changing poten-
tial. That process, though, has proven to be frustratingly
slow as Kate Millett notes in the introduction to the new
edition of Sexual Politics:
And the history of the emancipation of women
is--like other stories that describe the long, dif-
ficult winding down of oppressive
systems--circular; a little forward, almost as much
backward, then standstill, reaction, repression,
then another surge. (I)
Contemporary feminism has lost, in its effort to become
more socially acceptable, the raw, explosive energy and the
bold defiance that marked its early years. Feminist literary
critics such as Judith Spector would have feminist criticism
undergo the same weathering process to smooth the rough edges
and sharp corners, to supplant the blind rage with tolerant
plurality within the mainstream. Blind rage, such as that of
early feminist critics, certainly serves no constructive pur-
pose. But, a degree of rage is necessary to withstand the
onslaught of numbing indifference. Feminist theologian Mary
Daly calls rage "a convertible energy form" (370) to be cul-
tivated:
Rage is not a stage. It is not something to be got-
ten over. It is transformative, focusing Force.
26
Like a horse who streaks across fields on a moonlit
night, her mane flying, Rage gallops on pounding
hooves of unleashed Passion. Rage...makes senses
come alive again, thrive again. (371)
Controlled rage directed toward the institutions which en-
force and promote unnatural, unreasonable gender differences
breaks through the mind-numbing effects of a popular culture
that enslaves both males and females. True identity can then
develop unfettered by oppressive conditions.
The "me" decade of the 70s and the materialistic,
self-centered acquisitiveness of the 80s have given
self-identity a bad name. Make no mistake about it--this pa-
per does not address those frivolous, trivial personal iden-
tity issues that fill the pages of pop psychology how-to
books cranked out by the thousands by the social scientists
eager to exploit the public's gullibility and desire for
easy, absolute answers to its every shortcoming. This paper
concerns the self and its subsequent affirmation as the fun-
damental unit of philosophical discourse. In The Courage to
Be, Paul Tillich offers a basic, workable definition of
self-identity which often serves as the starting point for
discussions on identity for both male and female critics:
The courage to be is the ethical act in which man
[sic] affirms his own being in spite of those el-
ements of his existence which conflict with his es-
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sential self-affirmation. (3)
Tillich further refines this definition by adding that "the
courage to be is the courage to affirm one's own reasonable
nature over what is accidental in us" (13). The portrayal of
women in literature and the critical treatment of them has,
for the better part of two thousand years, celebrated and
held up for emulation what is unnatural or accidental in
these women's lives and denied their true "reasonable
nature." Many critics would protest vociferously, but
feminist critics are restoring the natural law subverted by
centuries of misguided "truths." Tillich addresses internal
forces; however, his reasoning clearly applies to "acciden-
tal" external forces such as culture as well. The combina-
tion of external and internal forces which demands
self-denial explains why identity eludes so many non-white,
non-male persons living in a white male dominated world.
Consequently, those who must constantly engage in a struggle
to overcome both internal and external constraints on
selfhood are denied the true rewards of self-affirmation:
The affirmation of one's essential being in spite
of desires and anxieties creates joy.. ..Joy is the
emotional expression of the courageous Yes to one's
own true being. (14)
Emily Dickinson knew that joy of which Tillich spoke:
In many and reportless places
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We feel a Joy--
Reportless, also, but sincere as Nature
Or Deity--
It comes, without a consternation--
Dissolves--the same--
But leaves a sumptuous Destitution--
Without a Name--
Profane it by a search--we cannot
It has no home--
Nor we who having once inhaled it--
Thereafter roam.
#1382
Is it any wonder that female writers and critics write of
rage? Can there be any doubt that that rage is fully justi-
fied? Women have long known and written of the despair that
results when the natural process of self-affirmation is de-
nied them. Theirs is not a petty, selfish wish for personal
fulfillment but an elemental yearning common to all people.
Tillich says the full expression of the self precedes all
other acts:
...self-affirmation is the essential nature of ev-
ery being and as such its highest good. Perfect
self-affirmation is not an isolated act which
29
originates in the individual being but is par-
ticipation in the universal or divine act of
self-affirmation, which is the originating power in
every individual act. (23)
"Participation in the universal" represents a critical
component of true identity. In this sense, identity encom-
passes far more than the concept of individual identity so
common throughout much of the twentieth century. The indi-
vidual search for meaning and identity has been a major con-
cern in this century as writers and poets chronicle the pro-
cesses aimed at cutting through societal influences to find
authenticity. But, as Wayne Booth has noted, that rather
fruitless inward search of selfish individuals has only deep-
ened the void:
In that search one tends to peel off the
inauthentic, insincere, alien influences that might
deflect the self from its unique, individual des-
tiny. For many decades the last heirs of romantic
individualism have been peeling off elements as-
sumed to be the not-self: first the church, then
the family, then political and economic
forces....Sooner or later one hopes to locate and
remove all alien stuff and discover bedrock--but
what one discovers is emptiness... .(237)
The search itself becomes meaningless if affirmation of the
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individual self operates without regard for concerns beyond
the self. Selfish considerations aimed at the poet's per-
sonal gain or the critic's political gain have no moral sig-
nificance. The true artist has the courage to confront chaos,
to look straight in the eye of the void. Dickinson did just
that. In doing so, she overcame "what was accidental" in
her, achieving full "participation in the universal."
Erik Erikson, a psychotherapist who studied the teach-
ings of Freud and developed new theories based on Freud's
word, augments Tillich's definition of personal identity.
Erikson approaches identity as the culmination of conflict
resolution in the life cycle, resulting in, assuming the con-
flicts are resolved, a "healthy personality:"
[To achieve identity] the vital personality weath-
ers conflicts, inner and outer, re-emerging from
each crisis with an increased sense of inner unity,
with an increase of good judgment, and an increase
in the capacity to do well according to his [sic]
own standards and to the standards of those sig-
nificant to his. ...a healthy personality actively
masters his environment, shows a certain unity of
personality, and is able to perceive the world and
himself correctly. (91)
Would that these lofty, high-minded definitions had been
applied to all of humanity and not just a select few. When
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the natural processes of identity formation and the inherent
need for self-affirmation are blocked, the result, of course,
is the condition in which women have found and continue, even
in the last decade of the twentieth century, to find them-
selves. But this is no reason for despair: Our own
possessions--though our own-- / 'Tis well to hoard anew-- /
Remembering the Dimensions / Of Possibility" (#1208). What-
ever women own as their past expands the "Dimensions of Pos-
sibility."
Gender was, is, and most likely will continue to be the
primary distinction in human societal groups. Gender, more
than any other factor, determines role and function. The
qualities associated with masculine and feminine, however,
are not natural laws even though they have been assigned that
status in numerous cultures. Such notions--that women cannot
exhibit courage and valor, that men cannot nurture children,
that women lack intellectual ability, or that all men crave
power and control (just as a few examples)--limit the "dimen-
sions of possibility" for both men and women and focus undue
energy on secondary issues. Those traits so often associated
with the female gender do not represent innate differences
between the sexes. They are, as British historian Alexandra
Owen has explained, cultural notions that have, over time,
come to be regarded as inherent, endemic female qualities
(4). Our literature shows us repeatedly that the most
32
oppressive conditions cannot subdue the human spirit and
will, which have no gender. The real artist taps into that
deep well; she operates with cultural restraints, but she en-
joys freedom as she captures the magnitude of unfettered hu-
man possibility. Dickinson, who operated in the realms of
possibility, knew the source of her creative genius:
The Brain--is wider than the Sky--
For--put them side by side--
The one the other will contain
With ease--and You--beside--
The Brain is deeper than the sea--
For--hold them--Blue to Blue--
The one the other will absorb--
As Sponges--Buckets--do--
The Brain is just the weight of God--
For--Heft them--Pound for Pound--
And they will differ--if they do--
As Syllable from Sound--
#632
No culture yet has produced people free of associations
based on gender--male and female principles. While there are
qualities which are valued in both genders, culturally as-
cribed male qualities and female qualities delineate and pro-
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scribe most human endeavors. It is a biological fact, not a
state of cultural conditioning, that only the female of the
species can carry, give birth to, and nurse a child. Con-
versely, only the male can impregnate a female. These how-
ever, are the only activities strictly limited to one sex.
To read much of the feminist propoganda of the past thirty
years, though, would lead one to believe that the male is no
longer necessary for the continuation of life. While debate
among the experts continues on the extent to which biology
and culture determine role and function, both male and female
critics and writers outside the feminist fold continue to
define female selfhood as secondary, always relative to the
male.
But to superimpose a feminine aesthetic or feminine
principle over the dominant male pattern is as woefully inad-
equate as the traditional assumption that male is synonomous
with humankind. We have yet to construct ideologies which
fully incorporate female existence. Visionary poets such as
Dickinson--whose poetry had its genesis in her everyday life,
offered a world view arising from experiences unique to a
woman, and was written using a woman's language--fared ex-
tremely poorly prior to the re-emergence of feminist
thought. Male critics and male-trained female critics com-
plained that women pursued the small, the personal, and the
domestic while avoiding the public, the political, and the
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intellectual aspects of life. In many cases, the criticism
is justified. Faced with social, moral, political, personal,
educational, religious, and economic constraints from birth
to death, most women, needless to say, failed to develop a
sense of themselves as an autonomous, independent whole per-
son. Transitory roles determined their identity. Those ex-
ceptional women who transcended cultural conditioning to as-
sert their identity as women faced censure, rejection, and
derogatory labeling. Emily Dickinson serves as only one ex-
ample. It took over one hundred years for her genius to be
appreciated, but she still is regarded as an eccentric re-
cluse. Even now, her personal life is of greater interest to
many readers and critics than her work. The critical assess-
ment of Dickinson and other women writers, poets, and art-
ists, all too often, centers on personal life: whether she
had a sex life, what sort of sex life it was, whether she was
married, why she did not marry, whether she was a good wife
and mother.
Chapter 2: Infinities of Nought, Many Leagues of Nowhere
Classical feminism, while not denying the body, while
not precluding self-image and self-knowledge, never
dreamed of engaging these as single-minded objectives.
Feminism means, has always meant, access to possi-
bilities beyond self-consciousness. Art, freed of re-
strictions, grows in any space, even the most confined.
But polemical self-knowledge is only partial discovery.
Each human being is a particle of a generation, a mote
among the revealing permutations of Society.
Self-consciousness (narcissism, solipsism) is small
nourishment for a writer. Literature is hungrier than
that: a writer with an ambitious imagination needs an
appetite beyond the self.
Cynthia Ozick
Each Life Converges to some Centre-
Expressed-or still-





Most of the preeminent feminist critics have acknowl-
edged the importance of self identity to women writers. In
her often-quoted text, The Resisting Reader, Judith
Fetterley, citing Emily Dickinson as a prime example, says
that women experience consciousness as a sense of loss:
"Forced in every way to identify with men, yet incessantly
reminded of being a woman, she undergoes a transformation
into an 'it,' the dominion of personhood lost indeed" (1x).
Dickinson's words can indeed support such a conclusion:
A loss of something ever felt I--
The first that I could recollect
Bereft I was--of what I knew not
Too young that any should suspect
A Mourner walked among the children
I notwithstanding went about
As one bemoaning a Dominion
Itself the only Prince cast out--
Elder, Today, a session wiser
And fainter, too, as Wiseness is--
I find myself still softly searching
For my Delinquent Palaces--
(#959 1-12)
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That is, of course, one reading of the poem, but there is an-
other. This poem need not be viewed as a funereal dirge since
this loss of childhood innocence (and the loss here is child-
hood loss) occurs as a normal event in the maturation pro-
cess. One of the "careers" open to Victorian-era women was
perpetual childhood, and Dickinson stubbornly clung to child-
hood long after her peers accepted their adult status. She
did not, however, attempt to stifle her intellectual develop-
ment; instead, she welcomed the increasing complexity of her
mental ability:
...
I find my feet have further Goals-
I smile upon the Aims
That felt so ample-Yesterday-
Today's-have vaster claims-
I do not doubt the self I was
Was competent to me-
But something awkward in the fit-
Proves that-outgrown-I see-
(#563 5-12)
Seeing, thinking, and knowing as an adult places heavy de-
mands on the soul, as Dickinson well knew; she was, however,
willing to pay the price to attain knowledge and wisdom.
This poem brings to mind Paul's words to the Corinthians,
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which Dickinson would also have known well: "When I was a
child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought
as a child: but when I became a man, I put away childish
things" (II Cor. 13:11). Nor is it unusual for an adult to
sometimes look back at childhood with regret and longing.
Since Dickinson rejected so much of what was considered nor-
mal for a woman in her time, inevitably she would eventually
experience a sense of loss. Actually, she willfully rejected
the conventions of nineteenth century womanhood so as to pre-
serve what she valued most--her sense of self. Furthermore,
nothing in her work suggests that she mourns the loss of a
bit of flesh as the Freudian critics insist.
That she be "cast out" was her own choice, a decision
consciously made so that she could pursue her vocation as a
poet. Calling Dickinson a "genius" and "a practical woman
exercising her gift as she had to," Adrienne Rich argues
strongly against seeing the poet as a victim:
I have a notion that genius knows itself; that
Dickinson chose her sec7lusion, knowing she was ex-
ceptional and knowing what she needed. It was,
moreover, no hermetic retreat, but a seclusion
which included a wide range of people, of reading
and correspondence. But she carefully selected her
society and controlled the disposal of her time.
Given her vocation, she was neither eccentric nor
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quaint; she was determined to survive, to use her
powers, to practice necessary economies. (Vesuvius
102)
Dickinson's trademark "searching" overshadows the sense of
loss, confinement and isolation when viewed in context with
her desire to know exactly what will endure: "Best
gains--must have the Losses' Test-- / To constitute
them--Gains--" (#684 1-2). Even Sewall, her most traditional
and conservative biographer, saw her "withdrawal into her
father's house not a retreat from life" but as an "adventure
into life, a penetration of life she elected to discover and
explore" (155). Her isolation and confinement, which were
nowhere near as total as many critics make it out to be, gave
her the freedom she needed:
And then-the size of this "small" life-
The Sages-call it small-
Swelled-like Horizons-in my vest-
And I sneered-softly-"small"!
(#271 13-16)
In Women Writers and Poetic Identity Margaret Homans
contends that "women writers cannot see their minds as an-
drogynous, or as sexless," (3) because the "literary tradi-
tion" in which they live and write identifies human qualities
as male. Consequently, women writers "must take part in a
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self-definition by contraries." (3). Homans is half right.
Why must a poet strive for a "sexless" or "androgynous" mind;
why should any poet attempt to "break out of the terms of
gender altogether" (209) as Homans says of Dickinson? By
failing to search for new ideas, Homans reports what has
been. The real truth here is the myth of universality.
Theoretically, great literature transcends gender; it speaks
for all people for all time. Nonsense! First of all, such
an idealistic notion is probably impossible. Secondly, great
literature speaks for and interprets the truth as seen by the
poets relative to their culture and their time and their
sex. As Bennett notes, "People, not angels, create art,
though we long to attribute art to angels. And people,
whether male or female, can write only what their lives en-
able them to say" (10). Bennett and Alicia Ostriker use such
reasoning to argue for the existence of "women's poetry" with
a long tradition of its own. Ostriker represents the views of
other feminist critics in her attack on universality:
The belief that true poetry is genderless--which is
a disguised form of believing that true poetry is
masculine--means that we have not learned to see
women poets generically, to recognize the tradition
they belong to, or to discuss either the limita-
tions or the strengths of that tradition. For writ-
ers necessarily articulate gendered experience just
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as they necessarily articulate the spirit of a na-
tionality, an age, a language. (9)
As a poet Dickinson shattered the myths by presenting
herself as an authoratative, powerful figure. Criticism is
just now catching up. Feminist critics such as Bennett and
Ostriker do not intend to dismantle or splinter the accepted
canon; their aim is to open literature to new possibilities
because "the critical insistence that poetry should be uni-
versal often presupposes a far too narrow notion of what is
universal" (Ostriker 13). That literature represents uni-
versal truth is a fiction, a pretense; it always contains
personal subjectivity. What for centuries has been regarded
as universal truth is one view of reality, and that one very
important fact justifies the existence of feminist criticism
whose purpose it is "to give voice to a different reality and
different vision, to bring a different subjectivity to bear
on the old universality" (Fetterley xi).
In the massive work, The Madwoman in the Attic, Sandra
Gilbert and Susan Gubar identify the female urge to redefine
the self in the nineteenth century as a response to the
male-defined and "male dominated society" (xl) that made them
"prisoners of their own gender" (85). These two influential
critics who grace the most prestigious "women's conferences"
expand the categorization of male qualities and female
qualities set forth by Mary Ellmann in Thinking About Women
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in 1968. Gilbert and Gubar attempt a Herculean task: to
"dissect" and then "murder" the imprisoning images of woman
so prevalent in our literature and then to reconstruct a
truer image based on the way actual women writers and poets
saw themselves; in other words, to extend the range of female
experience beyond the virgin/whore, angel/monster di-
chotomies. Their statement of the fundamental problem facing
the female artist echoes a refrain through subsequent
feminist criticism which has followed the publication of
their work: "For all literary artists, of course,
self-definition necessarily precedes self-assertion. The
creative 'I Am' cannot be uttered if the 'I' knows not what
it is" (17).
Fortunately, Dickinson recognized the diverse elements
of her being. Consequently, Gilbert's and Gubar's theory
breaks apart when they read Dickinson as a fragmented,
self-seeking, powerless woman. Drawing on the poet's
extensive catalog of possibilities for herself as a woman,
they claim that "Emily Dickinson herself became a
madwoman--became...both ironically a madwoman (a deliberate
impersonation of a madwoman) and truly a madwoman (a helpless
agoraphobic, trapped in her father's house)" (583). Appar-
ently, Gilbert and Gubar who, like John Cody, see diversity
as psychosis, lack "the discerning eye" to see that "much
madness is divinest sense." Such readings defy common sense,
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but they are quite common as Bennett explains:
Many critics have, understandably, seen in the emo-
tional diversity and contradictions of Dickinson's
poetry evidence of psychic fragmentation. But the
various psychological states which Dickinson de-
scribes in her poetry are all ones that, in one way
or another, most people experience in their lives.
It is not her experience of them but the precision
and vividness with which she records them that sets
Dickinson apart. (148)
Unlike so many women of her century, Dickinson refused to
write only of cloying, romantic love and the joys of domes-
ticity. She freely expressed the dark, hidden side of her
soul. As Bennett argues, her willingness to face the inner
and outer demons kept her from insanity: "Her energy was not
bound up in repression. She knew clearly who and what she
was... .Dickinson's sense of self was utterly firm" (148).
Poem #1142 best illustrates her self-sufficiency:
The Props assist the House
Until the House is built
And then the Props withdraw
And adequate, erect,
The House support itself
And cease to recollect
The Auger and the Carpenter--
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Just such a retrospect
Hath a perfected Life--
A past of Plank and Nail
And slowness--then the Scaffolds drop
Affirming it a Soul.
In Literary Women. Ellen Moers states "that 'the self'
is one of the great themes in all literature, by men and
women both," but she contradicts that idea by saying that
"nothing separates female experience from male experience
more sharply, and more early in life, than the compulsion to
visualize the self" (244). Moers and her Literary Women both
have reached virtual reverential status in the feminist camp,
but in all fairness, the current crop of critics needs to
recognize the fallacies in her claims. Moers mistakenly as-
sociates "self-disgust, self-hatred, and the impetus to
self-destruction" (107) with the female, and she errs even
further by using Emily Dickinson and Christina Rossetti to
illustrate her point. Identity formation, in all its complex-
ity, is a human characteristic, not one peculiar to only the
female sex, and matters of identity thoroughly inform the ex-
isting canon.
Once again, it is Paula Bennett who sees the crucial
difference between the male and the female tradition:
Lacking the male poet's long-established tradition
of self-exploration and self-validation, women
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poets in our culture have been torn between re-
strictive definitions of what a woman is and their
own fears of being or seeming unwomanly. As a re-
sult, they have been unable to allow the full truth
of their experience to empower their speaking
voice. (4)
Again, here is one more reason that Dickinson and her
self-concept remain crucial to the development of a feminist
aesthethic--Dickinson used the "full truth" of her "experi-
ence to empower" her "speaking voice." Paradoxically, by ex-
pressing the full truth, Dickinson and her poetry often
violate and contradict the political aims of feminist
criticism. The "Empress of Calvary" is, quite often, "caught
Without her Diadem." Poetry accounts for the totality of ex-
perience, and in Dickinson's case, the full range of her men-
tal experience covers tremendous ground. When the poet said
"The mind is meant for mighty freight" she meant it sin-
cerely. Dickinson spoke fiercely and fearlessly on her con-
dition and status, and never was she hindered by fears of
seeming unwomanly. She is aggressive and assertive; her vo-
cation demands that she be.
Pearson and Pope expand and further explain Bennett's
"restrictive definitions," calling them "societal myths"
which hinder the development of self-identity in women.
These societal myths--"the myth of sex differences, the myth
_
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of virginity, the myth of romantic love, and the myth of ma-
ternal self-sacrifice"--cripple and destroy women leaving
them capable only as "a secondary, supporting character in a
man's story who is unworthy and unable to do anything other
than self-destruct for the sake of others" (18). Those myths
precisely define the early critical view of Dickinson--the
fragile spinster, the quasi-nun, the rejected lover secluded
in her father's house. Dickinson does escape the "myth of
maternal self-sacrifice" only to be consigned to a life of
perpetual childhood.
The critical work of Romans, Moers, Fetterley,
Gilbert, and Gubar--recognized leaders in American feminist
criticism--forms the backbone of the feminist canon, and
newer critics build their cases on the ideas laid down by
these women. Certainly, some validity can be found in these
claims; each critic added to the useful knowledge concerning
the poet. They failed, however, to meet Rich's challenge to
"re-vision the past." They simply do not go far enough, per-
haps because they know their claims will collapse if their
arguments are carried to their logical conclusions. Their
theories do not hold up under careful scrutiny. For example,
Fetterley contends that women such as Dickinson define them-
selves in terms of what they do not have. Ironically, just
as Ozick noted, such a position reverses early feminist
claims that Freud's similar assumptions about psychosexual
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development were a key component in the "patriarchial"
domination of women.
As late as 1979 Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar recog-
nized the embryonic state of feminist criticism. In their
introduction to Shakespeare's Sisters, Gilbert and Gubar in-
sist:
most criticism of poetry by women has failed to
transcend the misogyny...just as it has failed to
explore in any but the most superficial ways the
crucial relationship between sexual identity and
art... .That the themes, structures, and images of
their art may have been at least in part necessi-
tated either by the special constrictions of the
sexual role or by their uncertain relationship to
an overwhelmingly masculinist [sic] literary tradi-
tion is a matter that feminist critics have just
begun to explore. (xxiii)
In the intervening eleven years that relationship still
perplexes critics as they continue to sift through social and
cultural issues of dubious value to literary criticism. As
Gilbert and Gubar implied in 1979, only after that pre-
liminary groundwork has been laid can "true feminist
criticism" (xxvi) develop. Now is the time. In another
ironic turn, just as feminist criticism emerges from its de-
velopmental years some critics are eager to merge with main-
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stream criticism. For instance, in Women Reading Women's
Writing, a recent collection of critical essays, as the title
implies, by women about women's writing, the editor Sue Roe
begins her introduction with a disclaimer: "Women Reading 
Women's Writing is not a book about feminism, nor does it of-
fer feminist theories of reading" (1). Roe admits to having
a "discreet dissatisfaction with the whole notion of feminist
theory" (2). She wisely sees that feminist criticism cannot
be packaged and marketed as one unified theory with all its
advocates falling in step to support an agreed-upon agenda,
for "feminist criticism is not...a system, a methodology, but
widely diverse positions, socially, politically, and in terms
of aesthetic judgment" (3).
Contrast this conciliatory view with that of early
feminist critics such as Dorin Schumacher who urged women to
reject Western cultural traditions, or Lillian Robinson who
called for revolutionary criticism. That early raving brings
to mind Wayne Booth's astute observation that "every critical
revolution tends to speak more clearly about what it opposes
than what it embraces" and that "revolutionaries depend on
their oppressors far more than they know" (386).
In spite of this incendiary rhetoric, these and other
like-minded, bold critics formulated a few worthwhile prin-
ciples that continue to engage the minds of female critics.
As Ellen Messer-Davidow summarizes, "when we adopt tradi-
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tional perspectives, the consequences to us are the
marginalization, negation, objectification, and alienation of
our female selves in the service of a critical self" (75).
Messer-Davidow's claims are well documented and supported
with compelling evidence, but she fails to mention that the
critic faces consequences of equal weight if all tradition is
abandoned as Robinson and Schumacher advocated. Much of the
criticism they would dismantle contains sound reasoning; for
example, Tate said:
[when] the intellectual and religious background of
an age no longer contains the whole spirit, the
poet proceeds to examine that background in terms
of immediate experience. But the background is
necessary; otherwise all the arts (not only poetry)
would have to rise in a vacuum. Poetry does not
dispense with tradition; it probes the deficiencies
of a tradition. But it must have a tradition to
probe. (89)
Poetry is neither ahistorical nor is it acultural;
rather it contains the history of a people as they have lived
their lives and thought beyond the immediate concerns of
day-to-day living. As early women poets and contemporary poet
and writer Cynthia Ozick insist, with the written word the
human mind has the power to claim freedom, regardless of what
limits tradition places on lives.
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However, it is time to move beyond this passive,
negative, reactionary blame-placing engaged in by so many
contemporary feminist critics; further documentation of the
obvious benefits the critics opposed to a feminine ethic.
Thus far, most feminist criticism resembles random blasts
fired from poorly-placed shotguns when the situation calls
for a single shot from a strategically placed rifle in the
hands of an expert. Paula Bennett is one new critic who hits
the target. Bennett does not shy away from the truth even
when being honest will cost her the support of many of her
feminist colleagues:
The woman writer's principal antagonists are not
the strong male or female who may have preceded her
within the tradition, but the inhibiting voices
that live within herself. (10)
Dickinson faced the same dilemma in her relationships with
women who possessed "dimity convictions." She recognized
early in life that her individual destiny veered sharply from
the path these "gentlewomen" trod. Granted, admitting the
power of those inner voices is a bitter pill to swallow, but
swallow it we must to make a meaningful and enduring contri-
bution to literary scholarship. Reactionary diatribes ex-
plode with a bright flash only to fade rapidly to oblivion.
Chapter 3: Bind me- I still can sing-
Bind me-1 still can sing-
Banish-my mandolin
Strikes true within-






A close look at the work of Emily Dickinson-- a poet
wilo developed a strong sense of self-identity, built confi-
dence in her ability as a poet, felt secure in her identity
as a female, and appreciated the power of her intellect--
shows just how difficult it is for a woman to develop herself
as an intellectual power to be reckoned with. As early as
1860 Dickinson said, "My business is to find!" Two years
later her introspection grows more precise:
I felt my life with both my hands
To see if it was there--
I held my spirit to the Glass,
To prove it possibler--
I turned my Being round and round
And paused at every pound
To ask the Owner's name--
For doubt, that I should know the Sound--
(#351 1-8)
Throughout her writing life she turned her "Being round
and round." Early letters, especially those to female
friends, also indicate her intense curiosity concerning her
innermost being. That search for the ultimate answer to the
reason for her being reaches its climax in what is perhaps
Dickinson's most perplexing poem: "My Life had stood--a
Loaded Gun-- / In Corners--till a Day The Owner
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passed--identified-- / And carried Me away--" (#754 1-4).
She did, indeed, "know the Sound." Here the self, the artis-
tic, creative self is pure dynamic force. While the poem is
frequently anthologized for its phallic imagery, it is also
notable for its forceful imagery not often associated with
the female. In this poem, the female is to be hunted and
killed. Once the self is realized and named, once the speaker
has been empowered as an "I," she becomes "fully identified
with the life of pure destructive power; she is what she
does, and the mountains echo back their correspondent
rifle-crack" (McNeil 176). The "I" of the poem is all inclu-
sive: male, female, object. This poem is also central to
Rich's analysis of Dickinson and gender; Rich says that
Dickinson goes "so far beyond the ideology of the feminine
and the conventions of womanly feeling" that she cannot be
categorized by "anything so simple as masculine and feminine
identity" (Vesuvius 112).
Reaching this point, though, required unrelenting
self-examination to get beyond the facade of nineteenth cen-
tury femininity: "Ourself behind ourself, concealed-- /
Should startle most-- / Assassin hid in our Apartment / Be
Horror's least" (#670 13-16). That "concealed self," that
powerful, dangerous, autonomous self, she knew was not sup-
posed to exist. Dickinson rejected, though, all the other
options open to her to nourish this independent self. Her
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quest for knowledge focused on the concealed elements hidden
to the world, but nevertheless the driving forces in the hu-
man experience. In poem after poem she reiterates the need to
look within: "The "Tune is in the Tree-' / The
Skeptic-showeth me- / 'No Sir! In Thee!" and "The Table is
not laid without / Till it is laid within." Much like her
Puritan ancestors, Dickinson felt a moral imperative to
achieve inner growth toward spiritual ideals:
Growth of Man-like Growth of Nature-
Gravitates within-




Through the solitary prowess
Of a Silent Life-
... (#750 1-8)
Dickinson made use of the material at hand, her own con-
sciousness, that "Undiscovered Continent," the "Indestruc-
tible Estate," and her diligent exploration of that mysteri-
ous realm yielded profound psychological insights that her
religious community failed to supply. Her quest, as she re-
alized, was an ongoing one to be pursued day after day be-
cause "Your thoughts don't have words every day / They come a
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single time / Like signal esoteric sips / Of the communion
Wine" (#1452 1-4). Her openness to experience led her to know
that "Contained in this short Life / Are magical extents"
that justify the pain and the loneliness she felt as a re-
sult of her chosen lifestyle. Like Virginia Woolf years
later, she sought and recorded those brief individual moments
of vision, the fleeting glimpses of true perspective. To ex-
perience those "magical extents" though, Dickinson knew that
she must never abandon one basic truth: "Finding is the
first Act." She approached her search for knowledge with the
same fervor her close companions and relatives devoted to
their religious experiences, as Joanne Feit Diehl noted:
...when Dickinson writes of her experience, she characteris-
tically sees it as an adventure, a journey through rugged,
hostile terrain toward an end both untested and potentially
fatal" (168). However dangerous that journey might be,
Dickinson's Puritan heritage compelled her to act.
Dickinson's firm stance regarding the duties of the soul
reflects her Puritan background, another key idea in her work
which feminist critics portray negatively. The Puritan in-
fluence was on the wane in her lifetime, but it profoundly
affected her sense of identity with its emphasis on the indi-
vidual need to study the self, the world, and the Bible and
to conduct a "spiritual examination of personal experience"
(Gilbert and Gubar, Anthology 46). In The Mind of the Poet
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Albert Gelpi sees Dickinson's Puritan heritage as the sup-
porting structure in her relentless study of personal iden-
tity. Dickinson flourished because, to the Puritan mind,
"universal religious truth and individual human experience
were working not at cross purposes but toward concentricity"
(56). Rooted in this tradition, Dickinson could explore the
inner recesses of herself to form an identity unique and
separate from the conventions of time and place. She fits
into a long line of philosophers and poets who doubted and
questioned blind acceptance of authority, whether it be the
Bible or the philosophy of the early Greeks, preferring
instead the truth of individual experience. Gelpi links
Dickinson's perception of identity to that of Thoreau and
Whitman (99). As with Thoreau and Whitman, no matter how in-
tensely Dickinson felt an experience, no matter how tightly
the self was bound to the universal, a part of her "stood
aside as witness and recorder of action and response" (101).
To meet those obligations of her soul, Dickinson illumi-
nated the psychological states which most people repress or
deny and fearlessly catalogued those states with detached ob-
jectivity: In "The first Day's Night had come-" she says:
My Brain--begun to laugh-
I mumbled-like a fool-
And tho' tis years ago-that Day-
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My brain keeps giggling-still.
And Something's off-within-
That person that I was-
And this One-do not feel the same-
Could it be Madness-this?
(#410 13-20)
When a poet writes 109 poems beginning with "I" and 104
with "I" in the first line, it would seem to be an easy task
to define that poet's concept of self. In fact, "I" is the
most frequently occuring word in Dickinson's work (Sewall
715); one-fifth of her poems begin with "I". Nevertheless,
Dickinson's concept of self remains difficult to precisely
name and describe, when viewed within the context of feminist
criticism, because she adroitly maintains multiple personae;
she ranges from child, to wife, to lover, to man, to queen,
to nobody, to object, to the equal of Christ. Critics remain
divided in their assessment of the many voices of the poet.
Had Dickinson spoken only from the perspective of an unmar-
ried, New England woman, how narrow her range would have
been. That she could speak authoratatively on so many sub-
jects from multiple points of view and maintain her credibil-
ity attests to her skill as a poet, to the power of her in-
tellect, and to her creative genius rather than to the
fragmentation of her identity. As Wolff explains, Dickinson
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knew exactly what she was doing:
...each different Voice is a calculated tactic, an
attempt to touch her readers and engage them inti-
mately with the poetry. Each voice has its unique
advantages; each its limitations. A poet
self-conscious in her craft, she calculated this
element as carefully as every other. (178)
When critics with an axe to grind put aside political
considerations, Dickinson's concept of identity emerges fully
formed and infinitely complex. Cynthia Griffin Wolff says:
To be a great artist in any age requires an excep-
tional self-consciousness about the terms of one's
existence; thus in mid-nineteenth-century New En-
gland, any woman who wished to be a major poet was
forced to think with brutal honesty about the im-
plications of gender. (172)
Dickinson mastered "brutal honesty"; as Poem 1453 shows, her
phychological and moral makeup allowed her no choice:
A Counterfeit-a Plated Person-
I would not be-
Whatever strata of Iniquity
My Nature underlie-
Truth is good Health-and Safety, and the Sky.
How meagre, what an Exile-is a Lie,
And Vocal-when we die-
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Oddly enough, Dickinson's sense of self-identity differs
greatly from that of most feminist critics. While most
feminist critics center their studies on the search for or
development of identity, Dickinson, on the other hand,
sumes the presence of a feeling self, instead of depicting a
struggle towards self-knowledge" (McNeil 9). Perhaps more
importantly, Dickinson assumes a knowing self. While she
persistently questions and distrusts the basic ideas and con-
cepts underlying her Christian heritage, she consistently
trusts her own ability to know; she exhibits supreme confi-
dence in the validity of her judgment, her conclusions, and
her observations. Neither does she doubt her ability to ex-
press her new-found knowledge and understanding in concrete
words. In #1309 she considers herself a constant party to the
divine: "The Infinite a sudden Guest / Has been assumed to
be-- / But how can that stupendous come / Which never went
away?" In #1072 she calls herself "Empress of Calvary."
She may be small, a speck upon a ball, but she remains close
to her God. Her God is often a close companion with whom she
can banter as in "Papa above! / Regard a Mouse" and whose
word can be parodied as in "In the name of the Bee - / And of
the Butterfly- / And of the Breeze- Amen!"
Had Dickinson set forth her self concept solely in terms
of self-centered concerns, she would never have been included
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in the canon of American literature. Dickinson could have
written of narrow, private concerns. But she did not. She
could have confined her theme to a search for identity in the
constrained and restricted life of Amherst. But she did
not. Dickinson could have defined herself in terms of tradi-
tional roles--those of daughter, sister, aunt, wife, or spin-
ster. But she did not. Instead she wrestled in Jacobean
fashion with the integrity of the self in relation to cosmic
and universal elements, those "accidental elements" of which
Tillich spoke. As Cynthia Griffin Wolff has noted, "The po-
etry is not offered as a record of individual introspection,
however intelligent and sensitive that might be: Dickinson
does not intend to speak for herself, uniquely fashioned; she
intends to speak of the general condition... ."(142). Her
constant probing yielded profound insights into the inner
struggles of the human soul.
Dickinson engaged in a never-ending investigation of in-
dividual identity; Sewall, perhaps her most famous biogra-
pher, said Dickinson dealt with "two opposing subjects: her-
self and God" (157). Johnson also ranks "identity and
integrity" as being of "permanent importance" (246) to the
poet. In tracing the sense of identity through the body of
her poetry, a definite trend takes shape: Dickinson's sense
of identity as a female poet signals a new philosophical
ideal which recognizes, with no apologies and no qualifica-
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tions, the inherent worth of the female perspective and its
equal contribution to human kind. Wolff argues that the poet
was not preoccupied with gender, but "she was a woman, and
although she did not necessarily want to exploit that fact,
neither did she intend systematically to deny it" (177). That
attitude is conspiculously absent from early feminist
criticism.
That Dickinson did, in fact, consider her sex important
to her poetic ability and that she wrote with pleasure as a
woman quite likely raises doubts and prompts questions.
McNeil, who centers her carefully-reasoned biography on
Dickinson's search for knowledge, supports such a view: "Her
work is to find out all that she can, using her unsublimated
female self as agency for this knowledge" (149). Evidence
from the letters and poems strongly suggest that Dickinson
did desire to be a strong woman poet, that being a woman gave
her a perspective that was lacking in the literature that she
read. She placed herself squarely within a female tradition
of women writers and poets. In a letter to Higginson she
wrote, "Mrs. Hunt's Poems are stronger than any written by
Women since Mrs. Browning, with the exception of Mrs. Lewes"
(L 368), strongly suggesting that she considered womanhood as
a means of literary classification. She knew the work of her
female literary counterparts, especially the Brontes,
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and George Eliot, and referred
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to many of them in her letters and poems as "strong
Madonnas." Her letters also show that strong friendships with
female friends and relatives sustained and nurtured her all
her life. And her poetic imagery is overwhelmingly female,
not only the clitoral and vaginal imagery, but also the use
of domestic imagery common to a woman's life marks much of
her work. In Emily Dickinson:  Woman Poet Paula Bennett de-
votes a full length study to this idea.
A recent biographer of Dickinson, McNeil, contends that
"Dickinson's poetry changes literary theory;" reading her un-
conventional, direct, powerful, and often startling lyrics
forces the reder to "experience gaps and silences in the ex-
isting models" of critical theory. "Reading her," McNeil
says, "means redefining those models" (4). Dickinson remains
difficult to categorize. Some critics liken her to Donne,
others see her as a precursor to modernist poets. Regardless
of where she is placed, not only are the models of literary
criticism redefined, but also our body of knowledge dealing
with the full range of human experience. McNeil is correct
in her assertion; indeed, Dickinson's early critics attrib-
uted her innovative style to lack of ability. Until
relatively recently, biographies and criticism accentuated
the strangeness--Dickinson was considered an oddity, an ec-
centric, the reclusive spinster of Amherst. Without the
critical evaluation of feminist critics with their equally
S.
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innovative methods of viewing literature, Dickinson, "one of
the very greatest English poets" (McNeil 1) may well have
languished as an interesting aberation in the literary his-
tory of the nineteenth century.
Suzanne Juhasz consolidates the viewpoint of other influ-
ential feminist critics in her introduction to Feminist Crit-
ics Read Emily Dickinson (what she calls "the first collec-
tion of critical essays on Dickinson from a feminist
perspective") as she explains the key idea behind feminist
criticism and the importance of Dickinson's self-concept to
that line of thought:
The central assumption of feminist criticism is
that gender informs the nature of art, the nature
of biography, and the relation between them.
Dickinson is a woman poet, and this fact is inte-
gral to her identity. The contribution of feminist
criticism to Dickinson studies is twofold. Its
first function is revisionary. Traditional
criticism has presented Dickinson not only par-
tially but falsely. By splitting her identity into
two mutually exclusive elements, "woman" and
"poet," traditional criticism has represented two
persons, not one. Feminist criticism begins by
putting the pieces together: woman and poet, woman
poet and her poetry. Next feminist criticism moves
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from re-interpretation to new kinds of interpreta-
tion, because it observes from a perspective that
not only takes into account the significance of
gender in life and art but sees female gender, in
particular, as a positive instead of a negative
factor. (1)
In Emily Dickinson woman and poet come together as never
before in literary history.
Male critics did ensure Dickinson's place in American
literary history, but with their attitudes which sound conde-
scending to modern women, Tate, Crowe, and Ransom consigned
Dickinson to secondary status. It is not entirely their
fault, however. Dickinson simply does not fit neatly into
their critical schemes, just as she does not quite fit con-
temporary feminist criticism; no period adequately contains
the full range of her genius. In a recent article that il-
lustrates the continuing importance of feminist criticism,
Margaret Dickie wrote:
One of the most obdurate institutional restraints
in literary criticism is the periodization of lit-
erature for purposes of teaching, of analysis, and
of specialization. These periods, created by a
male-dominated literary establishment for a pre-
dominately male literary tradition and sanctioned
by a chronlogical inevitability, may be fictions,
65
but they have the tenacity of convenience and con-
vention. (397)
Dickie employs a feminist perspective and Dickinson to argue
against periodization; she selects Dickinson because "her
writing life spanned literary periods" and because she is
"generally considered so far outside the main currents of the
period that she is not always included in major studies of
the time" (397).
Assuming that feminist criticism needs even more justi-
fication for its existence, the Tate and company assessment
of Dickinson as a poet offers compelling evidence. Without
the insight of feminist critics, Dickinson could have re-
mained a diminished person, a "Nobody," a bird-like, fragile
creature in white, suitable for little more than speculation
as to the identity of her lover and/or "Master." Instead, we
have a richly-textured, multi-faceted portrait of a woman
poet who, as Paula Bennett says in Emily Dickinson: Woman
Poet "wanted to stretch the boundaries of what it meant to be
a woman and to write in a womanly way" (18) and who continues
to perplex critics and attract readers of both sexes.
Although Dickinson projected a strong self-identity, she
experienced the restrictive cultural binds explained in ex-
cruciating detail in feminist writing across the academic
disciplines during the past three decades. Her inner con-
flict with the oughts and shoulds of her day fueled her most
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memorable poetry. She addressed her isolation in "I saw no
Way," saying "I alone-- / A Speck upon a Ball-- / Went out
upon Circumference--" (#378 5-7). In "It would have starved a
Gnat--" she depicts the smallness of her life and her inabil-
ity to end or change that state:
It would have starved a Gnat--
To live so small as I--
And yet I was a living Child--
With Food's necessity
Upon me--like a claw--
I could no more remove
Than I could coax a Leech away--
Or make a Dragon--move--
Nor like the Gnat--had I--
The privilege to fly
And seek a Dinner for myself--
How mightier He--than I--
Nor like Himself--the Art
Upon the Window Pane
To gad my little Being out--
And not begin--again--
#612
Dickinson understood the searing pain brought about by lack-
ing the power to act on her own behalf. Like the gnat and
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the leech, both bloodsuckers, her "small" life tried to suck
the vitality, the life-blood from her.
Consider Dickinson's life which "would have starved a
gnat" with the boundless freedom of Whitman to see the dif-
ference in the female tradition and the male tradition.
Dickinson wrote of herself as Nobody at roughly the same time
Whitman was claiming to be everybody (Ostriker 39). Sonq of 
Myself begins "I Celebrate myself, and sing myself." From
"Assurances" in Leaves of Grass comes "I do not doubt I am
limitless" (562). And from Song of the Open Road:
From this hour I ordain myself loos'd of limits and
imaginary lines,
Going where I list, my own master total and absolute,
Listening to others, considering well what they say,
Pausing, searching, receiving, contemplating,
Gently, but with undeniable will, divesting myself of
the holds that would hold me. (299)
In A Song of Joys Whitman celebrates his "manly self-hood"
which is "servile to none" and "defers to none" (328). In
contrast, Dickinson laments "What Liberty! So Captives deem /
Who tight in Dungeons are" and "I never hear the word "es-
cape" / Without a quicker blood...But I tug childish at my
bars / Only to fail again!" At times, yes, the poet feels
"Vesuvian" power, but at many other times she exhibits the
same powerlessness that informs the women's tradition:
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To be excluded from a literature that claims to de-
fine one's identity is to experience a peculiar
form of powerlessness-not simply the powerlessness
which derives from not seeing one's experience ar-
ticulated, clarified, and legitimazed in art, but
more significantly the powerlessness which results
from the endless division of self against self, the
consequence of the invocation to identify as male
while being reminded that to be male-to be univer-
sal, to be American-is to be not female.
(Fetterley xiii)
In Dickinson, with her frequent use of a male prrsona and her
many poems containing bodies fragmented and divided into
parts, feminist critics rightly see the revolting powerless-
ness women feel when denied the right to name and explain
their life experience. If Whitman is the poet of openness and
freedom, then Dickinson is the voice of his
opposite--enclosed spaces and confinement. Whitman's open
road contrasts sharply with Dickinson's rooms, houses, and
haunted chambers. While Whitman joyously sings his "Song of
Myself," Dickinson says, "I am afraid to own a Body-- / I am
afraid to own a Soul--."
As divergent as their paths may have been, Whitman and
Dickinson share common ground in their belief in the impor-
tance of the self. In "Small the Theme of My Chant" from the
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1869 edition of Leaves of Grass Whitman writes, "Small the
theme of My Chant, yet the greatest--namely, / One's Self--a
simple, separate person" (627). And in "Quicksand Years"
Whitman parallels Dickinson's line of thought:
One's-self must never give away--that is the final
substance--that out of all is sure,
Out of politics, triumphs, battles, life, what at last
finally remains?
When shows break up what but One's-Self is sure? (563)
The lines from Whitman exemplify individual freedom--one
of the great themes of American literature. Man escapes the
tyranny of stifling conventions to define himself by pitting
individual strength against hostile elements--man against so-
ciety. "Lighting out for the territory" remains an American
mystique. Late in the nineteenth century young men could set
out to seek experience; young women were kept at home by the
restrictions of sex and class. While the men explored and
conquered, women saw their very lives threatened by clothing
which bound their bodies so tightly they could neither
breathe properly nor exercise freely and by social conven-
tions that kept them close to the confines of home. This
great theme of freedom in American literature is only one
more manifestation of the male stranglehold on both American
literature and criticism. "Lighting out for the territory,"
until quite recently, was a male prerogative. Once again,
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the male standard is accepted as the condition for all
Americans, to the almost utter exclusion of the vast ethnic,
racial, geographic, and sexual diversity of this nation.
Such uncompromising attitudes persisted far into the twenti-
eth century. Mickey Pearlman, in her introduction to
American Women Writing Fiction: Memory, Identity, Family, 
Space elaborates:
American literature, we are taught, is about es-
cape, escape from perceived or real evil
(Hawthorne), from intellectual anguish (Bellow),
from the debilitating effects of social, political,
and religious forces (Dreiser, Mailer, Malamud),
from the castrating parental figure (Washington
Irving, Roth), or from psychological disorder
(Melville), from materialism and the masses
(Whitman), from the drudgery of the commonplace
(Hemingway), from time that either entraps you
(Faulkner) or that is amorphous and free-flowing
(Twain). (1)
Not a single woman among the group of our most respected
writers. These writers do write about women, but most of
them conceive of their women as objects, as property to be
owned, always defined in relation to a man, always respon-
sible for the emotional environment upon which identity for-
mation rests, but, at the same time, denied the opportunity
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for independent identity development (Pearlman 3). Ultimate
authority rests with the male voice. Not surprisingly, many
American women write of confinement and small spaces, what
Pearlman calls "the usually imprisoning psychological and ac-
tual spaces..., of being trapped, submerged, and overwhelmed"
(5). Ostriker carries this a step further in saying that "the
history of women's poetry in America is a tale of confine-
ments" (15). Dickinson exemplifies such entrapment with her
imagery of being submerged, drowned in a sea, or trapped in
her father's house, but that entrapment is only one aspect of
a complex individual, a point many critics hesitate to ac-
knowledge.
Pearlman's comment contains much truth, and even a cur-
sory look at the body of Dickinson's work justifies her
claim. But, here lies another pitfall in feminist critical
theory. It must be remembered that always, in all cultures,
in all times, for the vast majority of the population, out-
side elements stifle the development of independent identity.
Women and men have always made complicated choices within the
limits imposed by culture. The underlying and unanswered
question, one with far-reaching implications for critics, is
how to endow the female quest for identity with the impor-
tance now given to the heroic quest of the male and
subsequently integrate the two. That is the mission of con-
temporary feminist critics.
Chapter 4: To be alive is power
To be alive is power
Existence-in itself-
Without a further function-
Omnipotence-Enough-
To be alive-and Will!
'Tis able as a God-
The Maker-of Ourselves-be what-
Such being Finitude!
(#677)
The Bone that has no Marrow,
What Ultimate for that?
It is not fit for Table
For Beggar or for Cat.
A Bone has obligations-
A Being has the same-
A Marrowless Assembly
Is culpabler than shame.
But how shall finished Creatures
A function fresh obtain?
Old Nicodemus' Phantom
Confronting us again! (#1274)
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Students and critics alike sometimes encounter diffi-
culty when identifying what Dickinson's poems are "about." A
clue to the difficulty in understanding her work lies in poem
#1222: "The Riddle we can guess / We speedily despise-- / Not
anything is stale so long / As Yesterday's surprise--." She
obviously made complexity her art as she consistently wrote
in an uncommon manner of themes common to all great
literature--faith, belief, mortality, immortality, God,
death, love, identity, and nature. The individual poems with
their enigmatic metaphors rarely lend themselves to neat and
tidy explications. One guiding principle, however, does un-
derlie the entire body of Dickinson's poetry. Whatever her
topic, whatever the voice, the common, unifying thread is the
search for knowledge. Even though she said, "I cautious,
scanned my little life," she knew that contained within that
"little life" was the source of infinite wisdom: "Behind
Me--dips Eternity-- / Before Me--Immortality--/ Myself--the
Term between--(#721 1-3). With intense, scrupulous honesty,
Dickinson studied "the Term between."
Implicit in her body of work is the knowledge that there
is no set of ever-constant rules: "In her poetry as in her
thought, Dickinson became an original, a being who was
self-conceived and therefore always capable of change"
(Bennett Woman Poet 41). As she observes the natural laws
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that govern the universe, she searches for the same "truths"
in human affairs. What she discovers is conflict, the result
of which is apparent contradiction in her work. Yet, this
apparent contradiction shows just how willing Dickinson was
to search for the truth wherever her mind led. When her work
is viewed in all its depth and breadth, the contradictions
are reconciled, or at least logically and reasonably ex-
plained. Quite simply, this poet studied and wrote of the
full range of human possibilities--a full life marked by
exuberant joy as well as numbing despair and all the possi-
bilities in between, all the while cognizant of the futility
of seeking only "bliss" while avoiding "woe"--"From neither
of them tho' he try / Can Human nature hide." Because of her
intense desire to know and to understand, to blend reason
with emotion, she treats even the most traumatic event with
calm precision and accuracy as evident in "I felt a funeral
in my brain" and "Pain has an element of blank."
While many critics have noted her intellect and her
questioning mind, few have realized the tremendous impact of
Dickinson's wisdom. Helen McNeil, calling Dickinson "a heu-
ristic poet, a poet of investigation, of knowledge as value,"
(9) is among the first, if not the first feminist critic, to
write of Dickinson as an important, influential force as a
philosophical poet. McNeil asserts that Dickinson denies the
mind/body dualism implicit in Western philosophy (10). Using
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"The Soul has bandaged moments--" as her primary evidence,
McNeil contends that Dickinson refuses to separate mind and
body, rather she fuses intellect and education with emotion
and feeling. What sets Dickinson apart from other poets is
her ability to intellectually observe (but not deny) emotion
with great objectivity because "the drive for knowledge
dominates, and the affairs of the heart are seen as part of
that knowledge, not separate" (14). Of prime importance and
significance is that in her most introspective poems she does
not "soften those emotions into acceptability or use poetry
as an escape" (14). Her stark revelations, her harsh and of-
ten painful admissions, startle the reader. The early ten-
dency to anthologize her cheerful, non-threatening verse led
to serious misrepresentations of her range as a poet.
Much to the chagrin of the feminist critics who treat
idle, feeble-minded women as helpless, wounded victims of
patriarchial society, Dickinson berated such women because
they lacked substance. She demanded that her personal rela-
tionships engage and stimulate her mind, to offer substance:
Experiment to me
Is every one I meet
If it contain a Kernel?
The Figure of a Nut
Presents upon a Tree
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Equally plausibly,
But Meat within, is requisite
To Squirrels, and to Me.
#1073
Just as she carefully selected her friends, Dickinson "ut-
terly refused to write down for an audience of lesser gifts
than her own" (Woolf 258).
The poem which begins "This Consciousness that is aware"
summarizes Dickinson's concept of identity. In this philo-
sophical statement she fuses detached intellectual observa-
tion with equally perceptive and vigilant introspection.
Battles may have raged between the inner and the outer, the
seen and the unseen, but those intense conflicts within al-
lowed Dickinson to clearly articulate a firm sense of her own
identity, an identity which was never in question. Part of
her genius lies in her unique ability to precisely identify
the various states which comprise the self. Although she ex-
plored with exquisite precision the many spiritual, psycho-
logical, and emotional phenomena which could splinter the
soul, she maintained basic integrity; she could split mind
and body for the sake of analysis and recombine them into a
seamless whole. In fact, the self which she constantly re-
fines and hones can stand defiant after monumental wrestling
with God:
He strained my faith-
Did he find it supple?





Not a nerve failed!
Wrung me-with Anguish-
But I never doubted him-
'Tho' for what wrong




Jesus-it's your little "John"!
Don't you know-me?
(#497)
In Dickinson: Anxiety of Gender, Vivian Pollack asserts
that "most of Emily Dickinson's poetry, and all of it that
matters, originates in frustration." She further argues that
"Dickinson's identity crisis was, broadly speaking, a crisis
of sexual identity..." (9). I deny such assertions. First
of all, sexual identity is only one component of full iden-
tity and to accord it primary status in Dickinson's case is
78
to overestimate its importance. Whether Emily Dickinson en-
joyed sex on her father's sofa or whether she went to her
grave as a virgin, while providing grist for the gossip mill,
represents irrelevant speculation that pulls Dickinson down
to the common level. At the same time, such speculation ig-
nores the totality of her experience with life. Regardless
of the constraints she faced, Dickinson engaged life to the
hilt; in fact, her life is a testament to the idea that life
can be fully lived under a variety of cultural conditions;
joy and wonder co-exist with pain and despair, and personal
disappointments and petty problems in no way diminish the
sheer excitement of being alive. That she secluded herself in
her room to write in no way diminishes her life because as
Wolff explains:
She was preternaturally gifted-sensitive and im-
mensely intelligent. The world is not organized to
meet the demands and capacities of a few such ex-
traordinary people, and it is scarcely surprising
that highly creative men and women often do not
lead lives that are successful when measured by
normal standards. (167)
While Dickinson's themes have been analyzed again and
again (and rightly so) over the years, the negative elements
have overshadowed the positive. Without a doubt, pain, suf-
fering, loss, and death account for a large portion of the
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poetry, but underneath the surface lies an irreducible core
of well-developed and tested identity with the will and power
to endure. Even Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, who tend to
see little but gloom, subjugation, and psychological distress
in nineteenth century women's poetry, do finally admit that
Dickinson places her emphasis "not upon her pain but upon her
triumph" (612). Dickinson never shrinks from her surgically
precise examination of the many causes of torment to the hu-
man soul. Whatever the cause of pain and torment, Dickinson
examined it as a specimen under a microscope. In "I measure
every Grief I meet" she lists in great detail the criteria by
which she evaluates human suffering--"the fashions--of the
Cross--" which form the core of many poems. As this poem in-
dicates and as Paula Bennett has noted in her latest work,
the goal of Dickinson's poems on self-examination "was to
celebrate the survival of the soul under adverse conditions
which God had appointed for it" (122). Dickinson took a prag-
matic approach to creating an environment in which she could
benefit from the many "adverse conditions" since she be-
lieved "Life-is what we make it-" and refused to accept the
terms and conditions life handed to her. As she measured her
grief "With narrow, probing, Eyes," she exemplified the en-
durance of the human spirit and "its enormous power to en-
dure, indeed to transcend, the pounding that life--or
God--gave it" (Bennett 122).
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Those critics whose goal is to find examples of victim-
ization, suffering, psychosis, and renunciation, most assur-
edly, find no paucity of material with which to work. The
critic who looks for eroticism finds it; the critic who looks
for confinement finds that, and the critic looking for small-
ness can find that. This apparent contradiction, however, is
not indicative of a tortured poet with a "fragmented self," a
term feminist critics seem quite fond of. Rather than using
a few illustrative poems to prove a position, the critic with
scholarly integrity will openly examine the poet's body of
work in its entirety. Only then can the poet's philosophical
stand be ascertained.
Dickinson's poetry has moral importance. The soul which
overcomes adversity with dignity attains spiritual sig-
nificance. Unfortunately, morality is out of fashion, so
many contemporary critics, those who suffer from terminal
trendiness, ignore moral issues. The early cultural critics,
Gilbert and Gubar especially, sought only to prove their main
premise: that Dickinson was a victim of cultural restraints,
that cultural conditioning led to self-denial, that social
conventions fragmented her sense of self. The
twentieth-century reader or critic who arbitrarily imposes
current standards on Dickinson severely undercuts the very
real moral implications in her work. As Jane Donahue
Eberwein has pointed out, "We take it for granted that she
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needed to break out of the limitations her culture placed
around her and that she, and we, would have benefitted from
greater freedom" (206). The truth is, Dickinson did not
rebel. In both letters and poems she expresses her satis-
faction with living as she did. She knows freedom, the re-
alistic freedom of which Harvard-educated critic and novelist
Marilyn French writes:
Freedom is the sense that we are choosing our own
bonds. It is not a lack or absence, but the pres-
ence of harmonious relations between us and our
condition, our acts, our relationships. Freedom
also includes duty, responsibility, and bonds as
well as our relatively independent states and acts;
it is the sense that we are using well those parts
of the self we want to use, enjoy using, in acts
and states we wish to be immersed in. (542)
While she recognized and wrote of the "smallness" of
her life, Dickinson refrained from criticizing the cultural
conditions bounding her life; those conditions were simply
part of her life, and she dealt which those which threatened
her creativity in a positive manner. She settled into
domestic life, and mlny poc-s ,Joint to her enjoyment of life
among women engaged in the numerous tasks necessary to pro-
mote the nineteenth century lifestyle of Amherst. The way
she arranged and lived her life remains problematic to
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feminist critics looking for a standards-bearer: "Instead of
smashing through limitations, she drew them in upon
herself--deliberately narrowing her life beyond the cultural
norms she assimilated" (Eberwein 215). The poet did see the
limitations and restrictions as deprivations, but she also
saw them as values which molded her work and her identity:
Essential Oils--are wrung--
The Attar from the Rose
Be not expressed by Suns--alone--
It is the gift of Screws--
#675
Nowhere is Dickinson's belief in the necessity of a trial
by fire more evident than in poem which begins "Dare you see
a Soul at the White Heat?"
Dare you see a Soul at the White Heat?
Then crouch within the door-
Red-is the Fire's common tint-
But when the vivid Ore
Has vanquished Flame's conditions,
It quivers from the Forge
Without a color, but the light
Of unanointed Blaze.
Least village has its Blacksmith
Whose Anvil's even ring
Sounds symbol for the finer Forge
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That soundless tugs-within-
Refining these impatient Ores
With Hammer, and with Blaze
Until the Designated Light
Repudiate the Forge-
(#365)
Even though he called her "unable to reason at all,"
Tate also stressed the moral implications in Dickinson's
work:
With the exception of Poe there is no other
American poet whose work so steadily emerges from
the framework of moral character...her. poetry con-
stantly moves within an absolute order of truths
(84).
Tate credited Dickinson with the unique ability to capture
the "clash of powerful opposites" (86) from an abstract per-
spective without losing the sensuous. Dickinson does not
separate thinking and feeling; each complements the other:
The Spirit lasts-but in what mode-
Below, the Body speaks,
But as the Spirit furnishes-
Apart, it never talks-
The Music in the Violin
Does not emerge alone
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But Arm in Arm with Touch, yet Touch
Alone-is not a Tune-
The Spirit lurks within the Flesh
Like Tides within the Sea
That make the Water live, estranged
What would the Either be?
... (#1576)
For this reason, because of this mutuality, she can examine
opposing forces without bias. Thinking and feeling, mind and
body can not be separated:
The Heart is the Capital of the Mind-
The Mind is a single State-







Historically, the woman poet who chose to write from a per-
spective that included her body, her emotions, and her feel-
ings has been denied consideration as a serious poet. With
Dickinson, the tide begins to turn.
Chapter 5: Between the form of Life and Life
Because the nature of poetry is to illuminate our darkness,
we should discover not only more of what it means to be a
woman but more of what it means to be human.
Alicia Suskin Ostriker
Between the form of Life and Life
The difference is as big
As Liquor at the Lip between
And Liquor in the Jug
The latter-excellent to keep-
But for ecstatic need
The corkless is superior-
I :,now for I have tried
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Eventually, feminist criticism as a separate discipline
will cease to be necessary because women and men are, after
all, similar members of a single species. Biological fact
dictates that each sex complements the other; each is part of
a larger whole, and this concept is the harmony of the
natural world. Male and female, mind and body, spirit and
flesh, and self and other need not be diametrically opposed.
Feminist theory as an intellectual system affirms that
the feminine is a crucial element of the human; heretofore,
such has not been the case. That feminist sensibility in-
forms and sometimes influences mainstream intellectual sys-
tems, but a full appreciation for that sensibility has not
yet penetrated the deep recesses of the academic conscious-
ness. As history repeatedly shows, one value system does not
easily supplant another. Indeed, wars have been waged for
less. The trend today is to tolerate feminist critics until
they come to their senses, renounce their errant ways, and
rejoin the fold. Because of this lack of seriousness toward
feminist ideals, it is far too early to concede the struggle
for the recognition of a feminist ethic which contains funda-
mental wisdom with the power to rehumanize all that we as a
people think, say, do, and write, and integrate feminist
criticism with mainstream criticism. It is time, though, to
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relegate to the past the shrill, cathartic, confessional, and
therapeutic aspects of feminist criticism that were, perhaps,
necessary components of the developmental process. Much of
the feminist terminology, too, deserves banishment--feminist,
masculinist (let's face it, who can say masculinist and keep
a straight face), womanist, phallic criticism, gynocentric
criticism. Such language that separates and categorizes with
hostility is divisive and only encourages antagonism. The
wild claims--that all people are the same regardless of
class, sex, or race, or that women are more fully human than
men, for example--must be replaced by balanced, reasonable
scholarship which recognizes that males and females are en-
meshed in an interdependent web. As Jung and Emily Dickinson
knew, there is a hidden man in every woman and a hidden woman
in every man.
Just as Dickinson's views challenged the traditional as-
sumptions regarding propriety in her native New England,
feminist theory challenges the most basic relationships in
our culture. It undermines accepted values and offers
radical new ways of ordering experience. The resulting
anxiety brought about by the conflict of the old which tries
to justify and maintain itself, and the new which deprives
the old value system of its powers, not surprisingly, engen-
ders strong resistance. Paul Tillich has noted that ,such
anxiety comes at the end of an era when "the accustomed
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structures of meaning, power, belief, and order disintegrate"
(62). Feminist theory, contrary to popular opinion, is not
the sole cause of the current widespread breakdown of tradi-
tional values; indeed, feminist theory is the intellectual
system that can supplement traditional values. Roe envisions
feminist criticism as an intermediary in the current conflict
among the various hostile factions: "At its best, feminist
criticism can offer a kind of meeting ground, a possibility
for confrontation, for reappraisal, for quiet rethinking and
reassessment" (4). While such a position will not appeal to
the radical elements on both sides of the issue, it is a sen-
sible position.
Erik Erikson said that "it is only in periods of marked
transitions that the innovators appear" (32). Feminist crit-
ics are the innovators in this time of transition.
Shakespeare produced his remarkable body of work in a society
caught between the medieval world and the emerging modern
world; Augustine and his Christian colleagues had to master
the techniques of pagan learning to advance and defend their
early Christian faith. Dickinson, too, wrote in a period
marked by the overlap and straining of divergent views as her
country emerged from the Puritan Era, fought a bloody civil
war, and moved into the Industrial Age. Even though she was
influenced by the romantic idealism of the previous age,
Dickinson spoke with a new voice, and she confronted head on
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new subject matter. Dickinson's analytical, precise observa-
tions of her life as a woman in a small New England town
challenged the conception of what was appropriate subject
matter for poetry.
Significantly, there now exists a similar overlap be-
tween men and women, traditionalists and innovators. Eventu-
ally, synthesis will come as the divergent views meld, bring-
ing an essential balance to the fields of literature and
criticism. The fully realized human moves through a wide
range of roles in the course of a lifetime, each role requir-
ing a different set of skills and personal qualities; good
literature, by its very nature, captures the essence of those
human responses (sometimes male, sometimes female) which
change little with the passing of time. Good criticism should
do no less. So far, American feminism has neither escaped nor
transcended the constraints of gender; it has reversed and
reproduced them. As such, it represents a gross failure of
imagination, for there is no unchanging essence that makes a
woman a woman or a man a man. The gender dichotomy does,
though, color all human experience. That women bear chil-
dren is due to sex; that women nuture children is due to gen-
der, a cultural construct. Men too have submitted and
adapted to biological necessity. But, there remains a lim-
ited number of proven biological differences between the
sexes. Those proven biological differences demand close scru-
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tiny before they are accepted as givens because as
Messer-Daividow points out:
Much that has passsed for scientifically estab-
lished 'fact' about sex traits, feminists contend,
is invalidated by the androcentric perspectives and
misogynistic values that have warped the choice of
subjects, problems, methods, and designs in re-
search. (78).
Unfortunately, these limited differences have been vastly ex-
aggerated by cultural interpretations, and these same exag-
gerations over time have become sacred relics, cherished
generation after generation as divine or natural law.
In the field of literature, and perhaps in other fields
of study as well, feminist critics stand on the verge of a
breakthrough as women tear down barrier after barrier. Yet,
Betty Schmitz, who conducted an extensive study on "integrat-
ing women's studies into the curriculum" for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education, insists that it will still require decades
to "involve more faculty in teaching from a feminist perspec-
tive and to expose more students to the new scholarship on
women" (8). Based on extensive analysis of women's studies
in programs, Schmitz advocates "curriculum integration" as
opposed to a separate women's studies curriculum because iso-
lated departments will further distance women from the main-
stream of literary study. To concede defeat now is
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unthinkable, but courage is required to forge ahead-courage
to stand firm against deeply ingrained traditions and courage
to risk occasional failure and frequent setbacks. Only with
courage, the courage to be female, can feminist critics claim
intellectual arrogance and assert the right to reorder liter-
ary theory.
Early feminist criticism offered little intellectual
satisfaction and challenge as it probed representations of
women or images in literature. The mission to expose oppres-
sive, dominating structures that obscured alternative modes
of being stopped short of its goal by failing to offer a new
view with a strong moral and philosophical base.
In the sciences, a theory must take into account and ex-
plain all data, not just pieces of data selectively chosen by
the scientist. Literary theory should be no different.
Helen McNeil says this of Dickinson's poetry: "Her fierce
power sets a standard for which no one need apologize" (146).
Feminist critics must strive for the same standard of excel-
lence. But, feminist criticism, heretofore, has often exhib-
ited shabby scholarship as its most vocal proponents pounced
on details that were often trivial and insignificant and
built their house on that shaky foundation. Nowhere is that
more apparent than with the feminist assessment of Emily
Dickinson. Their handling of Dickinson clearly shows that
the intellectual level of this relatively new critical theory
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fails when it goes up against a poet with Dickinson's intel-
lectual integrity. As Schmitz noted, "women's studies must
transform itself before it can represent for the rest of the
academy the truth about human experience" (7).
Feminist criticism, nevertheless, fills a void in liter-
ary theory, a void that Allen Tate described forty years ago,
a decade before the rise of feminist criticism. Tate said
that for poetry of fundamental ideas such as Dickinson's "we
lack a tradition of criticism:"
There were no points of critical reference passed
on to us from a preceding generation. I am not up-
holding here the so-called dead hand of tradition,
but rather a rational insight into the meaning of
the present in terms of some imaginable past im-
plicit in our own lives; we need a body of ideas
that can bear upon the course of the spirit
remain coherent as a rational instrument.




into the past, and derive our standards from
imaginative constructions of the future. The hard
contingency of fact invariably breaks down, leaving
us the intellectual chaos which is the sore dis-
tress of American criticism. (82)
In all probability, Tate would have blasted feminist
criticism as "heresy" and "shallow nonsense" just as he did
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Marxist criticism, but the emerging feminist criticisms meet
his challenge.
A fundamental problem remains in reviewing work by and
about women: an inadequacy of acceptable terms for describ-
ing the female experience coupled with a still vague under-
standing of both real and perceived differences in male and
female consciousness. This means that much work in this
field remains to be done. To fully accept handed-down tradi-
tion serves to reinforce flawed patterns of thinking that
created the current state of affairs. To create a new
feminist tradition errs in the opposite direction. The al-
ternative is to change (more than some would prefer, but less
than others would prefer) so that the full truth of human ex-
istence is carried forward in literature and criticism.
The critical interpretation of literary history, at
present, is only a partial record at best. While women are
and have been central, not marginal, to the creation of our
literary heritage, the rich, full reality of what women have
done and experienced has been left unrecorded, neglected, and
ignored in interpretation. And even that partial record is
distorted because, for the most part, it comes from the view-
point of the male half of humanity. Messer-Davidow calls the
needed new ideal "perspectivism" and defines it as
a feminist philosophy that counters objectivism,
which privileges objects, and subjectivism, which
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privileges subjects. Perspectivism would bring to-
gether, in processes of knowing, the personal and
cultural, subjective and objective-replacing di-
chotomies with a systemic understanding of how and
what we see. It would explain how we affiliate
culturally, acquire a self-centered perspective,
experience the perspectives of others, and deploy
multiple perspectives in inquiry. (89)
What Messer-Davidow outlines is exactly what Emily Dickinson
did. Stuck between life and the form of life, women writ-
ers, poets, and critics must pick up that loaded gun.
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